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Peace Implementation and the Concept of Induced Consent in Peace
Operations
DAVID JABLONSKY and JAMES S. McCALLUM

From Parameters, Spring 1999, pp. 54-70.

C lassic or traditional United Nations peacekeeping operations are conducted by small forces, armed only for selfdefense. The forces are deployed between factions after formal or informal cessation of hostilities and only with the
consent of the factions. The purpose of these operations is to provide impartial reassurance to all sides that the ceasefire is being observed. United Nations peace enforcement operations, on the other hand, are normally conducted with
large, well-armed forces deployed under the provisions of Chapter VII of the UN Charter to stop ongoing hostilities
and to punish aggression. This type of mission virtually assures that peace enforcement operations neither have the
consent of all combatants, nor can be carried out with any degree of impartiality.
In recent years, theorists have attempted to address the doctrinal void in the so-called "gray area" of conflict between
traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement.[1] One result is a new concept of induced consent focused on that
segment of the gray area dealing with failed or failing states involved in intrastate conflict.[2] At first blush, the idea of
inducing consent for a settlement among factions in such conflicts appears to border on the oxymoronic. At the very
least, the concept would require an extremely delicate balance between coercion and rewards to be successful. This
article seeks to demonstrate how the concept of induced consent can establish that balance in a limited portion of the
gray area.
The Cold War Setting
The Cold War caused impasses and shortcuts in establishing principles for peace operations that obscured fundamental
doctrinal problems. The founders of the UN had created Chapter VII, peace enforcement, in the Charter as the only
alternative to Chapter VI, pacific settlement; Chapter VII seemed to reflect a new realism based on the experiences of
the interwar years. It introduced, for instance, the idea of escalating collective responses to interstate aggression using
all elements of power. And the dismal military legacy of the League of Nations was acknowledged by providing
"teeth" to the UN, requiring members to make available as needed forces, facilities, and any other means of assistance
necessary to maintain or restore peace. Finally, there was the proposed Military Staff Committee, to be led by the
Chiefs of Staff of the five permanent members of the Security Council, which would provide "strategic direction" to
any armed forces put at the UN's disposal.
The ultimate realism in Chapter VII, however, was in Article 51, the right of all states to individual or collective selfdefense, a well-founded acknowledgment that collective security peace enforcement could fail. The deepening chill of
the Cold War was set against the most potent element in the Charter, the great power veto provision. Agreements were
to be "worked out subsequently" for placing national forces at the general disposal of the UN and for commanding
such forces. In the ensuing negotiations, the United States actually advocated a total from all contributors of 20
divisions, 1250 bombers, 2250 fighters, 3 battleships, 6 carriers, 15 cruisers, 84 destroyers, and 90 submarines.[3] The
negotiations, not surprisingly, never reached fruition because of fundamental disagreements among the five Security
Council permanent representatives involving the composition and strength of the contributions. The result was a much
diminished concept of collective peace enforcement in the Cold War, reflected in the UN-authorized "coalition forces"
deployed to Korea, made possible only by the absence of the Soviet representative, and to Desert Storm, made possible
by Soviet cooperation at the end of its decline.
The inability to fulfill the original enforcement goals of the UN Charter produced a doctrinal fix that fell short of
collective coercion, but still had some utility when states decided on cease-fires rather than pacific means to settle their

disputes. The principles of traditional peacekeeping, dubbed "Chapter six-and-a-half" by Dag Hammarskjold, emerged
as a result of experiences by UN forces deployed to the Middle East subsequent to the 1956 Suez crisis. The basic
premise of the emerging doctrine was that peacekeeping forces could not create the conditions for their own success-could not create the peace they were required to keep. Consent of the belligerents to the presence of peacekeepers was
thus absolutely essential to an agreement to some type of cease-fire. Consent, in turn, was closely tied to the perceived
impartiality of the peacekeeping troops, whose role was to keep the factions separated by maintaining buffer zones and
monitoring the cessation of hostilities. As a result, Cold War doctrine for traditional peacekeeping required small,
lightly armed troops that used force only in self-defense and, if necessary, to complete their mission. This military
weakness assured all the factions that peacekeepers could not change the balance, but were instead a device solely to
guarantee the transparency of all sides.[4]
These adjustments to Cold War impediments contributed to the initial euphoria concerning peace operations in the
immediate wake of that conflict. Even if standing forces had been established, there still would have been a need for
the Security Council to create new doctrine for military operations, since many of the conflicts the UN had dealt with
did not reflect clear-cut interstate aggression. The crisis in the Congo, for instance, revealed doctrinal problems in a
new environment for both peace enforcement and peacekeeping that had only been postponed by the bipolar standoff.
That standoff also glossed over the short-term nature of peacekeeping doctrine, the limited objective of which was
itself the product of the Cold War. Cease-fires which rarely lasted were a far cry from conflict resolution. And as the
UN experience in Cyprus demonstrated, when such pauses did endure, they could reinforce a solution deemed
illegitimate by one side, thus making more difficult a settlement that appeared progressively less urgent. Cessation of
hostilities may be a necessary condition for peacemaking, but after the Cold War it became clearer that cessation was
far from sufficient for conflict resolution.[5]
The New Environment
In the wake of the Cold War the great powers, liberated from that conflict's geostrategic balance of power, were
increasingly willing to work within the UN framework to solve emerging problems in countries around the world. This
change contributed to the growing tendency on the part of the Security Council to agree on cooperative actions as
crises arose.[6] Moreover, regional peace agreements between 1985 and 1991 in areas ranging from Namibia to
Central America were creating a demand for traditional peacekeeping. One result was an increase in such operations,
large enough that by 1992 Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali could speak of a "crisis of too much
credibility."[7] Another result was a growing belief that traditional peacekeeping forces could deal with intrastate
conflict--a belief that reached a high-water mark in 1991 when a UN guard contingent deployed to northern Iraq. The
safety of that force, of course, had already been ensured by the defeat of the Iraqi army during the Gulf conflict, the
earlier occupation by US and NATO forces under "Provide Comfort," and the continuing allied air cover.[8]
Nevertheless, such operations only bolstered a new tendency to blur the distinction between traditional peacekeeping
operations and coercive action, particularly concerning the requirement of the former for the consent of the
belligerents.
Optimism and Disillusionment
These trends were reflected in the Secretary General's 1992 An Agenda for Peace, formulated as a guide for more
diverse and active UN peace operations in the post-Cold War era in response to comments by heads of state and
government during a Security Council summit. The document defined peacekeeping as "the deployment of a United
Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of the parties concerned."[9] An important concomitant to this
downgrading of consent was the Secretary General's vague call for a new UN military role falling somewhere between
peacekeeping and all-out warfighting. The expectation was that the Security Council would examine the role of peace
enforcement units in cases in which belligerents had not complied with previously agreed cease-fires and truces.[10] It
was a concept of peace enforcement that clearly went beyond the traditional Chapter VII focus on interstate acts of
aggression and implied that UN forces could play a role in the domestic affairs of failed or troubled states. Swept
along by the optimism reflected in An Agenda for Peace concerning the efficacy of collective action, the Security
Council in conjunction with the activist Secretary General generated more Chapter VII resolutions in 1992-93 than it
had in the entire existence of the United Nations.[11]

There was, however, no clear-cut doctrinal response to these developments, an unfortunate situation since many postCold War conflicts were already moving from the interstate model to an intrastate structure. This condition applied
whether the conflict stemmed from collapsed federal polities, such as the former Yugoslavia, or simply the absence of
or struggle over domestic authority, as in Angola and Somalia. What followed was a hurried, often inept expansion of
traditional peacekeeping, the one workable doctrine for the collective management of power that had emerged during
the Cold War. This newer, more forceful hybrid was superimposed on a vastly different environment in an attempt to
address a wide range of situations. What often resulted were inappropriately sized and inappropriately armed force
projections into "gray areas," which could not be helped, and in fact were endangered, by ad hoc peace enforcement
interventions. The 1993 US Quick Reaction Force in Somalia and the 1994-95 NATO air strikes in BosniaHerzegovina are examples of such operations. "It is no easy task," one UN official summed up this doctrinal dilemma,
"to make war and peace with the same people on the same territory at the same time."[12]
Reaction to the dilemma was mixed. On the one hand, some saw the either/or aspects of traditional peacekeeping
principles as incompatible with the emerging gray area. "Consent and impartiality," one analyst pointed out "are too
fragile to serve as a fulcrum around which a sensible doctrine can be built."[13] The logical result was the promotion
of a "robust" or "muscular" second generation of peacekeeping operations along a horizontal spectrum of action
between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Key to this spectrum was the assumption that an outside
force need not necessarily be dependent on, or have to promote or be guided by, the necessity of full consent. "The
size of the force," John Mackinlay concluded in this regard, "is dictated not by the characteristics of the task, such as
conflict prevention and protection, but by the degree of consent expected in the operation zone."[14]
On the other hand, UN peacekeeping failures in the new environment also inspired retrenchment, including rejection of
the idea that peace enforcement was merely one more stage in a peacekeeping continuum. "It is doubtful whether it is
right to highjack the respected term `peacekeeping' and apply it to actions that are not based on the full consent of all
the parties to the conflict and that involve the extensive use of force," Adam Roberts pointed out. "Is there not
something Orwellian about this?"[15] Certainly, by 1995 the leadership of the United Nations appeared to think so.
That year, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali issued a paper celebrating the 50th anniversary of the UN that modified
his earlier An Agenda for Peace. Peacekeeping operations required the consent of all parties, he emphasized, and the
use of force was not consistent with such operations. Even in the cause of faster conflict resolution, he concluded, it
was "necessary to resist the temptation to use military power."
The logic of peacekeeping flows from political and military premises that are quite distinct from those of
enforcement; and the dynamics of the latter are incompatible with the political process that peacekeeping
is intended to facilitate. To blur the distinction between the two can undermine the viability of the
peacekeeping operation and endanger its personnel.[16]
Wider Peacekeeping--The British Approach
The military doctrines of the United Kingdom and the United States appeared to mirror this conservative retrenchment.
For the British doctrine of Wider Peacekeeping, there could be no middle ground between the role of referee in
peacekeeping and the role of player implicit in any attempt at peace enforcement. The two types of peace operations
were thus "mutually exclusive activities" that could not be merged within the gray area. Consent of the belligerents
was the Rubicon of the separation: "The betraying characteristic of middle-ground theories is the downgrading of
consent from critical determinant to take-it-or-leave-it option."[17] In a similar manner, US military doctrine
maintained that peacekeeping and peace enforcement were
not part of a continuum allowing a unit to move freely from one to the other. A broad demarcation
separates these operations. . . . The crossing of the consent divide from [peacekeeping to peace
enforcement] is a policy level decision that fundamentally changes the nature of the operation.[18]
New doctrines regarding the emerging gray area were not quite as conservative as they appeared. For instance, the
British acknowledged that Wider Peacekeeping was likely to occur in environments characterized by elements that
could range from numerous parties to the conflict, undisciplined factions, ineffective cease fires, and the absence of
law and order to undefined areas of operations, violations of human rights, and collapse of political and civil

infrastructure. In such a milieu, those carrying out peace operations were likened to a tight-rope walker at a circus
who carries only a balancing pole, representative of the structure of consent, but still has to contend with a circus
audience that is restive and begins to throw objects at him. It was, in short, a concept that called for the "wider aspects
of peacekeeping operations carried out with the general consent of the belligerent parties but in an environment that
may be highly volatile."[19]
While it continued to reject a horizontal spectrum of consent in this more volatile environment, British doctrine
explored a vertical continuum encompassing the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of conflict. This continuum
was a doctrinal warfighting staple of both the US and British armies, designed to ensure that scattered tactical battles
and engagements would not degenerate into separate duels with no connection to higher strategic objectives. The key
to this concept was the operational level of war, at which a commander could synchronize tactical events in major
operations and campaigns to achieve theater strategic objectives.[20] By drawing on this vertical structure, it was
possible for the British doctrine of Wider Peacekeeping to incorporate compellence, in which peacekeeping forces
could still act decisively even if the full consent of the belligerents was lacking or incomplete. The important task was
to create a framework of consent at the strategic and operational levels that was "sufficiently robust" to withstand the
use of force at the tactical level.[21]
Thus the consent barrier could be breached at the tactical level with the measured application of a "maximum presence
of forces on the ground . . . desirable for wider Peacekeeping Operations, both for deterrence, credibility, and
information-gathering purposes and for domination, albeit discreetly, of the general environment."[22] Therefore the
use of force at the tactical level could "represent a valid consensual peacekeeping technique. Consent can thus
facilitate, not hinder, the use of force."[23] The key was the legitimacy of settlements at the higher levels and the need
to make the effect of this consent felt at the tactical level: "For example, if the theater commander has secured the
agreement of a faction leader to a particular course of action, he should then do everything he can to have that
agreement transmitted down to those faction members facing the tactical commanders in the field."[24] Thus the
British concept of Wider Peacekeeping did not diminish the problems inherent in a vertical approach to peace
operations.[25] At the very least, the concept offered an alternative to the problems of dealing with consent based on a
continuum along a horizontal spectrum between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. "Peacekeeping and Wider
Peacekeeping," the British manual concluded,
rely on having the consent of the belligerent parties, at least at the operational (i.e., theatre) level, and
depend on their success on consent-promoting techniques--peace enforcement does not. What divides
peacekeeping from peace enforcement, therefore, is not the level of violence, but the level of consent.[26]
Wider Peacekeeping--The Multi-Dimensional Approach
Wider Peacekeeping also evolved as a generic term for what came to be called "multi-disciplinary" or "multidimensional" operations during comprehensive settlements arrived at after lengthy peacemaking procedures. In many
cases, traditional peacekeeping had tended to inhibit or lead to the stagnation of conflict-resolving peacemaking. The
new type of operations, with a settlement in hand, could focus on peace-building, during which civilian and military
forces strengthened civil and humanitarian institutions, aided economic and social development, and organized
elections and full political participation. On the military level, Wider Peacekeeping enhanced commitments negotiated
with factions that could include cantonment of military forces, demobilization and disarmament, and even the
formation of a unified military.[27] Thus, this version of Wider Peacekeeping went beyond traditional peacekeeping
requirements for interposing forces after a cease-fire but before significant progress in conflict resolution.
Many of the new tasks were evident in the UN's involvement in civil wars ranging from Namibia and Angola to El
Salvador and Mozambique. New tasks in the new environment also made it clear that the concept of consent was still
evolving. In traditional peacekeeping, consent at the strategic and operational levels could generally be relied upon.
Leaders of states such as Egypt and Israel or of military wings such as the Palestinians or the Turkish Cypriots could
for the most part exercise control of their factions down through the tactical level. The post-Cold War focus on
intercommunal violence in failed or failing states, however, created new facets of consent, much different from those
envisioned in the original criteria for traditional peacekeeping. International organizations now might deal with
insurgent leaders at the strategic and operational levels, like those in Somalia and Cambodia, who brought to the

bargaining table very little understanding of traditional concepts of statesmanship or the rule of law.[28]
This lack of accountability often permeated to the tactical level, where local factional leaders might be barely, if at all,
controlled by agreements entered into by higher commanders at the negotiating table. One reason had to do with the
new peace-building tasks in the multidimensional peacekeeping milieu. In weapon control measures, for instance, the
traditional concept of consent could be overshadowed by the normal "security dilemma" that occurs when some
factions are unable or unwilling to match disarmament commitments. Tactical unpredictability could be caused by
uncontrollable splinter groups, or by local factions that lacked full information about the peace agreement, or by a
command and control structure that was deficient or nonexistent down to the tactical level. Whatever the reasons, the
result was that wider, multidimensional peacekeeping operations increasingly placed intervening forces in semipermissive tactical environments created by partial, sporadic, or decaying consent. And as demonstrated by the UN
Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia, vertical uncertainty can disable any force configured for traditional
peacekeeping.[29]
The result in recent years has been a renewed focus on the use of force to secure the operating environment in wider
peacekeeping missions. In 1989, for example, the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) authorized or at least
tolerated South Africa's use of the very forces being subjected to a UN arms embargo to block infiltration by members
of the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO). This use of force allowed UNTAG to complete
peacekeeping operations successfully that had expanded to include election monitoring. By 1993 Kofi Annan, as the
Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, could point out that the new multidimensional tasks for the UN
"call for `teeth' and `muscle,' in addition to less tangible qualities that we have sought in the past. In other words there
are increasing demands that the United Nations now enforce the peace as originally envisaged in the Charter."[30]
Peace enforcement in this context of producing a secure environment can extend to areas without comprehensive peace
settlements. In some cases, there could be a type of consensual Chapter VII in which factions concur on weapon
controls for humanitarian purposes, such as the "safe haven" of Srebrenica or the UN Protection Areas (UNPAs) in
Croatia. There also could be the more traditional coercive aspect of Chapter VII, but focused--like wider peacekeeping
operations--on violence reduction as the necessary basis for political change and even reconciliation among factions.
In Haiti, for example, the linkage to peacemaking and peace-building was implicit in the goal of Operation Uphold
Democracy, which was to provide "temporary security support to a society moving from authoritarianism to
democracy."[31] But by 1995, the most far-reaching use of the peace enforcement concept had to do with the Wider
Peacekeeping role of implementing peace settlements. Earlier that year, great power pressure caused the belligerents in
the former Yugoslavia to consent to the Dayton Peace Agreements. The induced nature of this consent at the strategic
and operational levels caused the UN to authorize a large, heavily armed Implementation Force (IFOR) under Chapter
VII to "take all necessary measures" to ensure compliance with the agreement down to the tactical level.[32]
Induced Consent
The international community continued throughout 1995 to exert pressure on warring belligerents throughout the world
to undertake or honor peaceful settlements. Early that year the Security Council instructed the Secretary General not to
deploy the troops authorized by the Council for the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) until the Angolan
parties demonstrated their willingness to honor commitments made to each other in their peace agreement. Equally
important, there was the recognition that in the new gray area there could be no return, as Sashi Tharoor pointed out, to
the "brave old world of buffer zones and policing cease-fires, the non-threatening application of military skills to
defuse conflicts."[33] Instead, any doctrine for the post-Cold War environment would have to include what Alexander
George has termed "forceful persuasion," in order to demonstrate to belligerents that the best option was a negotiated
settlement.[34] Consent would be the objective in such initiatives. But full consent of the belligerents in the gray area
might not always be forthcoming, requiring instead some degree of deterrence or compellence based on force that must
be used impartially. By the end of the year Secretary of Defense William Perry pointed out that "IFOR will be an
impressive force that will intimidate anybody in the area."[35]
Kofi Annan observed early in 1996 that speedy involvement in failed or failing states was at the core of his concept:
"The problem is that the `CNN Factor' tends to mobilize popular pressure at the peak of the problem--which is to say
at the very moment when effective intervention is most costly, most dangerous, and least likely to succeed."[36] But

early intervention in the new environment would require a modified approach to the most basic of traditional
peacekeeping conditions. In dealing with volatile, internal conflicts in societies teetering or already falling into
anarchy, Annan concluded, "the old dictum of `consent of the parties' will be neither right [nor] wrong; it will be, quite
simply, irrelevant."[37] Thus consent by the disputants could no longer be an independent variable.
Nevertheless, consent had always been a function of the options available and had depended on whether it would lead
to rewards or punishments once given. From this perspective, induced consent was not a new concept. During the Cold
War, when it was in their interest to end proxy wars before they became directly involved, the superpowers used the
possible increase or reduction of military and economic assistance to client states in order to induce consent for and
cooperation with peacekeeping operations. And if the purpose of the coercive aspects of inducement were, in Annan's
words, "to intimidate recalcitrants into cooperating," there were the post-Cold War examples ranging from the United
States-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) in Somalia and the French Operation Turquoise in Rwanda to the
multilateral force in Haiti.[38] Under such circumstances, the Under Secretary General pointed out, once consent had
been obtained, a major premise was that a credible force would be needed in the target area. At the same time, actions
in that area were also predicated on a measure of freely given consent by much of the population--something that
would also have to be encouraged and sustained. Annan acknowledged that the result was a fundamental contradiction
for forces caught between full-fledged enforcement operations and traditional peacekeeping. "The purpose of an
inducement operation is to build, not to destroy," he concluded, "even while intimidating into acquiescence those who
would prevent reconciliation."[39]
The Way Ahead--Inducement and Implementation
The inherent contradiction of induced consent notwithstanding, the concept can become a major feature of new
doctrine for gray area peace operations. But this is possible only if one portion of the gray area is addressed initially.
The void in that area is too broad and too complex for a comprehensive doctrinal approach. Secretary General Annan
has suggested as much by more narrowly defining gray area operations as those that fall between traditional
peacekeeping and multidimensional peace operations which implement "comprehensive settlements arrived at in good
faith on the basis of a lengthy political process."[40]
Credibility and the art of the possible are integral to this approach. Simply put, the credibility of the United Nations
and the attendant will of its member states are at stake. Just as Lester Pearson and Dag Hammarsjkold developed
traditional peacekeeping in the 1950s, so now Kofi Annan and subsequent leaders will have to chart a path for the UN
to move beyond the doctrinal turmoil of the 1990s. Otherwise, the UN could become irrelevant to the most important
needs of the international community. Any steps that the UN takes in this regard must be successful, for as a recent
report on the UN's enforcement capabilities concludes, the "key to long-term progress is to take small steps first, to
begin to lay a foundation on which to build later, as experience and changing conditions permit."[41]
This incremental approach is illustrated by the contrast between Somalia and post-Dayton Bosnia, two types of gray
area operations that the international community is likely to face in the future. A situation similar to that of Somalia at
the beginning of the 1990s is simply too complex to serve as a start point for developing doctrine. The international
community will have to begin with small, credible, successful steps, suggesting that doctrine development should focus
on future gray area operations similar to that in Bosnia subsequent to the Dayton accords. Such operations will be
characterized by a measure of consent in the form of a political settlement. The settlement, however, will not have the
"full faith" commitment of the parties, for consent at the strategic level will have been induced among the principals in
the conflict. Inducement in this sense is "a process of persuading, bringing about, or causing," casting "its net over all
forms of influence from reasoned discussion to threat of military force."[42]
The key to developing this new, more narrowly focused peacekeeping doctrine is to meld both the British and the
multidimensional approaches to Wider Peacekeeping. The multidimensional focus on implementing peace settlements
yields the ultimate organizing concept; the British focus on a vertical continuum provides the structure. Settlements
will follow peacemaking efforts at the strategic level in fora such as the UN and at the operational level by a peace
operation force whose presence in the region is based on consent induced among the principal parties to the conflict.
Consent will never be absolute in such an environment, and at the tactical level it may be ambiguous, in decline, or-among some factions and splinter groups--nonexistent. In order to exploit this unclear vertical relationship, UN forces

in this portion of the gray area will have to balance the need for limiting armed conflict with the longer term peace
building aspects of multidimensional tasks implicit in the generic term of Wider Peacekeeping.
Inducement Operations--The Multidimensional Approach to Wider Peacekeeping
Induced consent assumes the absence of the voluntary consent of traditional Cold War peacekeeping and
acknowledges the lack of full faith consent to the political settlement. In such an environment, inducement operations
can expect either sporadic or centrally coordinated opposition by a government, factions, or gangs. For the UN to
conduct such operations, it will have to deploy political-military forces sufficiently large and varied not only to punish,
but to reward and ultimately to resolve conflict. It is not an easy task under any circumstances. "Inducement and
enforcement operations," one study concludes in this regard, "are neither for the faint of heart nor the marginally
competent."[43]
The ability to intimidate is the first criterion for the use of force. This does not necessarily mean a heavy use of the
force. But it does mean a heavy deployment of robust military force that is equal to tasks inherent in Chapter VII
operations. A mismatch between forces and missions, due to lack of doctrine for the gray area and incomplete
understanding of the mission, has been a common failing in many post-Cold War UN interventions in troubled states.
Only with the proper matchup, as the NATO and national contingents in the Implementation Force and Stabilization
Force in Bosnia illustrate, will it be possible to field a credible force. This is absolutely essential, since credibility is
the bedrock foundation for deterring attacks on the civilian population and on UN forces, and for extended deterrence
against assaults on third parties, such as those conducting humanitarian, development, or peace-building missions. If a
UN force is unable from the outset of its intervention to deter such attacks, as was the case with UNPROFOR in
Bosnia, the more important mission of establishing extended deterrence will be virtually impossible.[44]
The introduction of a credible force must also be linked politically to the objectives of the peace operation. Without a
political context at least minimally agreed to by the indigenous parties, the use of force has no counterbalancing
incentives to change behavior. Thus one of the logical extensions of doctrine development for the narrowly defined
gray area involves a new concept of "peace-maintenance," defined as:
the overall political framework, as part of which the objectives of diplomatic activities, humanitarian
assistance, military forces, and civilian components are not only coordinated but harmonized. The concept
provides a link between the strategic and operational levels of command and control, and constitutes the
exercise by the international community as a whole of political authority within nations.[45]
This concept is necessary to doctrine developed under induced consent if that doctrine is to be used by the international
political, military, and humanitarian and development communities. The idea of entrusting international organizations
with political authority over a nation's domestic affairs is always controversial.[46] But without peace-maintenance,
the prospects of harmonizing political, military, and humanitarian and development efforts are significantly reduced.
Nowhere was this better illustrated in recent years than in Rwanda, where by 1993 a condominium of regional and
great powers had induced consent among the warring factions to a comprehensive peace settlement, the Arusha
Accords. Among the many deficiencies in the international community's subsequent efforts in that country was the lack
of adequate doctrine for the three communities to act effectively at the strategic level on that induced consent.[47]
All this simply acknowledges that coercion alone will never suffice. Inducement operations will have to balance the
punishment implicit in the intimidation factor with rewards that go beyond just the restoration of stability. The most
promising option in this regard is peace-building in the context of peace-maintenance. Recent UN Wider Peacekeeping
operations in the wake of comprehensive settlements indicate that the peace-building tasks associated with the
restoration of civilian society can have an immediate and positive effect on civil operations. In particular, the actions
of SFOR in Bosnia, harmonized as never before under the political authority of the High Representative, demonstrate
the possibilities of peace-maintenance with induced consent.[48]
Consequently an inducement force will have to be, in John Mackinlay's term, multifunctional and capable of
coordinating and conducting aid and peace-building projects that establish a reward structure derived from indigenous
civic action and peace incentives at the operational and tactical levels. These projects, as they have in recent
multidimensional peace operations, can range from infrastructure restoration to basic police, medical, and veterinary

services. At the same time, military and political options must be woven together in a constant and consistent effort
with incentives such as development and reconstruction work. Efforts at the operational and tactical levels to balance
rewards and punishments must be harmonized both vertically with the strategic level and horizontally across the
political, military, and humanitarian and development communities.
These efforts are important, because intimidation is bound to erode over time, causing instability that will adversely
affect the rewards process. Diminishing rewards, in turn, will reduce the chances of converting induced consent of the
belligerents to the presence of UN forces into a genuine consent for a peace settlement. In short, peacemaking
buttressed by the concept of peace-maintenance must be an essential and immediate by-product of rewards and
punishments applied at all levels to sustain induced consent.
Inducement Operations--The British Approach to Wider Peacekeeping
The key to inducement is the ability to adjust the variables and activities on the vertical continuum, descending from
strategy to operations to tactics, that is the hallmark of British Wider Peacekeeping. In this vertical continuum,
legitimacy reinforces consent and may initially be the dominating variable. At the strategic level, collective political
legitimization by the UN will remain important for inducement operations. At the very least, the use or threatened use
of compellence will always have greater legitimacy and credibility when buttressed by a Chapter VII authorization.
Moreover, there is value in the idea that the UN represents interests and values that transcend the focus of any one
belligerent, thus setting the stage at lower levels for impartiality to be linked not so much to actions between the
belligerents, as to actions required to carry out decisions of the Security Council. At the operational level, for instance,
the idea that there does not necessarily have to be a targeted adversary in inducement operations is particularly
valuable, since it sets such operations apart from full-fledged enforcement and is in keeping with Article 40 of the UN
Charter. This, in turn, helps create an environment at that level which facilitates understanding by the factional leaders
that beyond the legitimacy of power in collapsed states, there is also the power of legitimacy implicit in the peace
settlement, however forced their consent in the beginning.[49]
Once the initial cease-fire has taken hold at the operational level, the primary task of the UN force on the ground is to
ensure that the legitimacy of the settlement is felt at the lowest tactical level. It will seldom be an easy task. A common
complication in collapsed states is that indigenous political and military leaders exercise authority that is either weak or
has broken down and thus have little control over their tactical subordinates. There may also be rogue tactical factions,
ranging from splinter groups to bandits, that will not acknowledge any settlement imposed "from above."
These types of problems will require application of short-term military leverage that is finely calibrated and sharply
focused so that coercion does not preempt future cooperation. In such circumstances, unlike the experience of
traditional peacekeeping, force and impartiality will not necessarily be mutually exclusive. But it requires an unbroken
line of legitimization down the vertical continuum to support the limited use of force at the tactical level that enforces
a strategic UN mandate for a peace settlement at the operational and tactical levels. The legitimacy of these
agreements, no matter how induced the consent at higher levels on which that legitimacy is based, is essential and must
be constantly and publicly reaffirmed by the strategic and operational leaders responsible for carrying out UN carrotand-stick initiatives. Only in this way will it be possible for UN troops at the tactical level to apply minimum force
impartially, as if they were police forces upholding the law. The nuances of impartial force may be lost temporarily on
those to whom it is being applied. But if the legitimacy of higher settlements is intact and is sufficiently understood at
the tactical level, limited compellence will appear to be a logical concomitant of ongoing peace-building and
peacemaking efforts in the context of peace-maintenance. Certainly this remains an underlying principle in NATO
doctrine developed for operations in Bosnia, which asserted that it is possible to use "limited force against any party
that violates the mandate and still preserve the overall impartiality of the PSF [Peace Support Force]."[50]
The logic of legitimization will be short-lived, however, unless the UN force at the tactical level balances rewards and
punishments consistent with consent at the higher levels that provided the basis for legitimacy in the first place. In
terms of punishment, the force must have a credible capability to establish escalation dominance in the most critical
areas of operations. This capability also ties into a rewards system, particularly concerning the provision of a sufficient
level of protection and overall security to allow the unimpeded operation of the political authority in aid and peacebuilding efforts. This harmonization, both vertically and horizontally, requires a level of integration of military

operations with other international and indigenous actors that is unprecedented in the training and experience of most
political, military, humanitarian, and development organizations.
In this manner, UN forces establish for the majority of the civilian populace a positive association with the higherlevel settlements and are able to present any factional holdout as a threat to the benefits of these settlements. Added to
this is the synergistic effect of tactical peacemaking efforts on the operational level effort to achieve full consent to the
implementation of the peace settlement. Tactical operations that are a blend of political, military, and developmental
actions are the "battles" that shape the operational campaign to achieve the overall goal. The cumulative effect is one
that replaces autocratic images of political authority with those of sovereignty as a state recovers from collapse. But
such developments will have to be monitored closely, since new multidimensional tasks may emerge requiring support
by UN forces powerful enough to maintain escalation dominance. Operations in El Salvador and Mozambique have
demonstrated that in the absence of a powerful UN force, problems can occur during sophisticated activities such as
disarmament and demobilization. This intervention force must be adequate to provide reassurance until the former
belligerents can create their own unified army and police organizations.[51]
Conclusion
There is no quick fix to the doctrinal void in the gray area between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement.
The experiences of the international community in peace operations throughout the decade have shown that there can
be no comprehensive doctrinal approach to this area. The challenges are simply too varied and complex to be dealt
with by a single doctrinal concept. But the experiences of the 1990s have demonstrated that there are opportunities to
develop doctrine for a more narrowly circumscribed segment of the gray area, in which the international community
induces some measure of consent to a settlement by warring factions in a collapsing or collapsed state. The British
work in Wider Peacekeeping on the vertical approach to this inducement is a valuable contribution. This is also true of
the experience gained in multidimensional approaches to Wider Peacekeeping in terms of horizontal efforts to
coordinate political, military, and development operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels in order to
implement comprehensive settlements.
The multidimensional approach also reinforces the fact that it will not be enough for the militaries of member states
alone to write the new doctrine for induced consent operations. Military efforts need the support and involvement of
the political and development communities if the United Nations is to achieve the harmonization of effort that
practitioners--from Cambodia to Somalia to Rwanda to Haiti to Liberia to Bosnia--have indicated time and time again
is essential for any lasting success of an international intervention. It is this fully structured effort on the part of the
political, military, and developmental communities that establishes the fine balance of coercion and reward that is the
essence of successful induced consent operations. Only with this balance is it possible to begin the process of causing
factions at all levels in failed states to see themselves as shareholders in the peace process.
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